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On 13th September 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (First
Section) delivered its long-awaited judgment in Big Brother Watch and others v. the
United Kingdom. In a ruling of significant length (more than 200 pages), the Court
considered in detail the UK surveillance regime following the Edward Snowden
revelations and found that certain aspects of this violated Articles 8 (right to respect
for private and family life) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention.
Judgment
The Court reviewed three main issues concerning the compliance of the UK
surveillance framework contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
(RIPA) (now repealed by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA)) with Article 8
ECHR: i) the bulk interception of communications under section 8(4) of RIPA; ii) the
intelligence sharing regime between the USA and the UK whereby UK authorities
received material intercepted by the NSA under the PRISM and UPSTREAM
programmes; and, iii) the acquisition of communications data from Communications
Service Providers (‘CSPs’) under Chapter II of RIPA.
The bulk interception of communications
The Strasbourg Court noted that bulk interception programmes operated in
order to identify unknown threats to national security fall within States’ margin of
appreciation. Nevertheless, since all interception regimes (both bulk and targeted)
have the potential to be abused, the Court held that the discretion afforded to States
in operating such regimes ‘must necessarily be narrower’.
In this regard, the Court ruled that interception programmes must set out in the
law six minimum requirements, established in Weber and Saravia, ‘in order to be
sufficiently foreseeable to minimise the risk of abuses of power’. These are: the
nature of offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the
categories of people liable to have their communications intercepted; a limit on
the duration of interception; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and
storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the
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data to other parties; and the circumstances in which intercepted data may or must
be erased or destroyed. The Court decided to examine the justification for any
interference in the present case by reference to these six minimum requirements
having also regard to the three additional factors regarding secret surveillance
measures for national security purposes identified in Zakharov, namely the
arrangements for supervising the implementation of secret surveillance measures,
notification mechanisms and the remedies provided for by national law.
Concerning the question at issue, the Court noted that Section 8(4) of RIPA
permitted the bulk interception of both content and ‘related communications
data’ (data about the ‘who, when and where’ of a communication – essentially
metadata). Regarding the former, the ECtHR accepted that while anyone could
potentially have the content of their communications intercepted, it was clear that
the UK intelligence services were ‘neither intercepting everyone’s communications,
nor exercising an unfettered discretion to intercept whatever communications they
wish’ as communications of individuals known to be in the British islands were
excluded and the intelligence services employed targeted bearers to select these
communications most likely to carry intelligence value.  The Court, nevertheless,
raised concerns regarding the safeguards governing the selection of bearers for
interception and the selection of intercepted material for examination by an analyst
because the UK regime lacked robust independent oversight of the selectors and
search criteria used to filter intercepted communications.
What, however, proved fatal for section 8(4) was the exemption of ‘related
communications data’ from the safeguards applicable to the selection, search and
filtering of content data. Indeed, RIPA allowed UK intelligence services to search
and examine without restriction ‘related communications data’ of all intercepted
communications – even internal ones incidentally intercepted – on the grounds that
metadata are less intrusive than content data and they were necessary to determine
whether a person is or is not in the British islands. The Court was not persuaded
by the UK government’s arguments that metadata are less intrusive than content
data. In fact, the ECtHR pointed out that the content of an electronic communication
might be encrypted and, even if it were decrypted, might not reveal anything of
note about the sender or recipient, while metadata could reveal the identities and
geographic location of the sender and recipient and the equipment through which the
communication was transmitted. As the Court correctly observed:
‘In bulk, the degree of intrusion is magnified, since the patterns that emerge could
be capable of painting an intimate picture of a person through the mapping of social
networks, location tracking, Internet browsing tracking, mapping of communication
patterns, and insight into who a person interacted with’. The Court, therefore, held
that section 8(4) did not provide real safeguards for the selection of metadata for
examination and, thus, breached Article 8 ECHR as it did not meet the quality of law
requirement and was incapable of keeping the interference to what is ‘necessary in a
democratic society’.
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The intelligence sharing regime
The Court was asked to consider for the first time in the present case the compliance
of an intelligence sharing regime with the Convention. Adapting the minimum
requirements from Weber (see above), it examined the circumstances in which
intercept material can be requested; the procedure followed for examining, using
and storing the material obtained; the precautions taken when communicating the
material obtained to other parties; and the circumstances in which the material
obtained must be erased or destroyed and concluded that there were no significant
shortcomings in the application and operation of the US-UK intelligence sharing
regime and, therefore, no violation of Article 8 ECHR.
The acquisition of communications data from CSPs
The third issue that the Court had to consider under Article 8 was Chapter II of RIPA,
which allowed certain UK public authorities to acquire communications data from
CSPs. The Court’s analysis was rather short in this respect drawing extensively
from the CJEU’s judgments in Digital Rights Ireland and Watson, according to
which a communications’ retention scheme is lawful under EU law where access to
communications is limited to the objective of fighting serious crime; is subject to prior
review by a court or independent administrative authority; and the data concerned
are retained within the EU. The Court found a violation of Article 8 ECHR on the
basis that Chapter II RIPA permitted access to retained data for the purpose of
combating crime (rather than ‘serious crime’) and such access was not subject to
prior review by a court or independent administrative body – flaws that had already
been identified by the High Court.
Communications surveillance and Article 10 ECHR
The Court was also asked to examine the compatibility of section 8(4) and Chapter
II of RIPA with Article 10 ECHR. It held that the bulk interception regime violated
Article 10 ECHR because of the  potential chilling effect that this created to the
confidentiality of communications and the absence of any ‘above the waterline’
arrangements limiting the intelligence services’ ability to search and examine
confidential material. Finally, the Court concluded that Chapter II also breached
Article 10 ECHR due to the lack of sufficient safeguards in respect of confidential
journalistic material.
A Failed Update
This is without doubt a landmark decision of the Strasbourg Court marking a
victory for the fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of expression over
surveillance. The Court should be praised for recognising that bulk metadata
surveillance can be as intrusive – or even more intrusive – than access to the
content of communications. It is worth mentioning that the CJEU in its surveillance
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case-law has followed a slightly different approach on this issue, holding that
generalised access to the content of communications breaches ‘the essence of
the right to privacy’, while this is not the case for metadata, therefore, revealing
a differentiation between the two. This approach of the CJEU clearly disregards
the fact that in the context of the internet and modern digital technologies such a
distinction between accessing the content of communications or the metadata is
very problematic because metadata can often reveal more precise and sensitive
information than the data subject is aware about herself through aggregation and
the use of modern data mining and algorithmic techniques. In addition, it is often
the case that massive metadata internet surveillance is much more efficient and
effective than content access.
However, while it should be recognised that the Court’s discussion of the UK
surveillance regime in Big Brother and others v. the UK is comprehensive and
elaborate, overall its analysis appears archaic. The Court’s reliance on authorities,
principles and minimum requirements established many years ago (the Weber
and Saravia case was decided in 2006) against which modern digital surveillance
regimes should be evaluated is problematic. This criticism was raised by Judge
Kostelo, joined by Judge Turkovic in their partly concurring, partly dissenting
Opinion, but in my view it goes beyond the issue of ex ante judicial review of secret
surveillance. The problem lies in the all-encompassing scope of modern digital
surveillance – especially metadata surveillance but not only – that is undertaken in
a bulk, indiscriminate way without any differentiation, limitation or exception being
made for individuals with no link whatsoever to terrorism or serious crime, as the
CJEU held in Digital Rights Ireland.
By rejecting the applicants' request to ‘update’ its list of minimum requirements
against which surveillance regimes should be examined, the Strasbourg Court
missed a chance in the present case to make its case-law more adaptable to present
and future surveillance challenges.
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